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Introduction 
This essay addresses two problems whose outcome indicates the site where a 
dialogue between phenomenology and Nietzsche might begin. The first problem can be 
posed as a question: What is the “biology” to which Husserl refers in Appendix 23 of the 
Crisis (published 1936), and which is set forth as the “universal ontology?” The second 
problem concerns embodied consciousness and its life-world. If phenomenology was to 
serve as the foundation for all scientific endeavors, how then could biology be equated 
with ontology, and what relationship other than derivative could biology have to 
phenomenology? 
Let us recall the spirit of the Crisis of European Sciences in light of Husserl’s 
overarching project. By the time he published the Crisis, transcendental psychology was 
to lead back to the fundamental science of phenomenology. Not that Husserl had made a 
psychologistic turn; on the contrary, he was simply asserting the primacy of embodied, 
constituting consciousness as the foundation from which to derive what he called 
“regional ontologies.” A number of access routes thus opened to transcendental 
phenomenology, including the critical-historical, that of a fundamental psychology, and 
perhaps that of the biology to come, grounded in the Lebenswelt. Transcendental 
phenomenology remained the formal foundation of all other inquiries, subjective or 
objective. Phenomenological consciousness, as meaning-conferral, remained the dynamic 
correlation of noetic aiming and noematic donation, out of which other domains of 
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positive knowledge implicitly arose. Yet by the 1930s, Husserl’s investigation into 
intersubjective intropathy [Einfühlung], passive syntheses, and association had clearly 
shown the conundrums of phenomenological consciousness. Thus, consciousness was 
invariably embodied and tied to bodily movements (kinestheses). However, the essential 
ground of consciousness, as spontaneous self-constitution and as the flow of time, 
proceeded on the basis of now-moments and their retentions, rooted in neurological 
processes unavailable to phenomenological description. Thus, the brief arguments for 
biology, presented in Appendix 23 (left out of the English translation), had to do with 
Husserl’s efforts to situate life, understood as physiological processes in lived bodies, in 
relation to the consciousness brought to light by transcendental psychology. Nevertheless, 
if biology was to be universal ontology, that meant that the relationship between life and 
consciousness had come center stage, with life and consciousness, consciousness and the 
life-world constituting each other dynamically.  
[B]iology is certainly also—like all positive science—naïve science and 
“artwork,” where the word is understood as a higher analogy for 
craftsmanship. The higher consists in that [biology] carries in itself an 
obscure meaning, whose true and authentic ontological significance 
[Seinssinn] it seeks to work out as knowledge [Erkenntnis], although it can 
never reach this [knowledge] in its present form. But biology, above all, 
could never become a concrete theory of the life-world… [although] its 
proximity to the sources of evidence makes it so near to the depths of things 
themselves that the way toward transcendental philosophy ought to be 
easiest for it and with this too, the way to the true a priori… (Hua VI, 483) 
 
The argument for a higher level of inquiry in biology rested on a certainty about 
which Husserl had long been more dogmatic than Heidegger: a living being exists 
coupled at multiple levels with its world. It is never, as transcendental consciousness 
might be, separable from world or others. Therefore, the biology to come, for Husserl, 
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had to have as its object, “living,” understood as the correlations of organisms and their 
life-world. “Biology is, for humans, essentially directed by their actual, originally 
experienceable humanity, because life alone is original, above all, and given in an 
authentic way in the self-understanding of the biological [des Biologischen]” (Hua VI, 
482). Moreover, because living is “subjectivated,” individuated thanks to the interaction 
of organisms with their life-world, the biology of that world, as experienced by human 
consciousness “on Earth,” ought to be universal. It should provide concepts for 
understanding life in any Lebenswelt. Rather than overtaking transcendental psychology, 
the biology to come pointed to a long-standing tension in Husserl’s work between lived 
experience and its physiological conditions of possibility. This tension accompanied his 
investigations into affects and drives throughout the 1920’s and it haunted 
phenomenology in its formalist quality as the science of consciousness.  
By 1936, a dual tension was obvious in Husserl, between transcendental 
consciousness and embodiment on the one hand, and between subjective embodiment and 
life broadly construed as worldly on the other. How could the biology Husserl envisioned 
as “fundamental” simultaneously elucidate the living that qualified the Lebenswelt and 
the “psycho-physics” that underlay the dynamic flow and subjective pull of 
transcendental consciousness (as inner time and as ownness)? Was it just a thought 
experiment that led Husserl to argue that “biology is the concrete and authentic psycho-
physics” (Hua VI, 484)—and this, precisely because it “has the same world generality as 
physics”? In principle, this was more than an experiment. “Any sense that a biology of 
Venus could have, if we were to speak of this as a possibility, is thanks to the originary 
meaning-constitution [Sinnbildung] of our life-world, and hence, thanks to the theoretical 
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elaboration of this meaning-constitution through our biology…this task gives it an 
infinite horizon” (Hua VI, 484). If biology—reconstituted in accord with 
phenomenology’s approach to experience before it is divided into objective versus 
subjective experience—should rival physics through its direct and universal approach to 
life, then the biology to come should rival the transcendental psychology Husserl 
presented in the Crisis, because biology encompasses life as the dynamic of living, 
beyond consciousness as intentionality. Was this Husserl’s response to the vast appeal of 
Lebensphilosophie in the 1930s? Was it a way into the “world” Heidegger had considered 
in his hermeneutic of Dasein? However we answer these questions, Husserl clearly 
struggled against Heidegger’s approach to animal life, continually refining his conception 
of Einfühlung between 1910 and 1933. As the science of life, then, understood as self-
development and self-sensing, biology could alone provide the extra-phenomenological 
“roots” for embodied processes even as they enabled  and came into consciousness (as 
instincts, drives, and sensations). In turn, transcendental phenomenology would elucidate 
the multiple modes by which drives and sensations were synthesized as the conscious 
experience of life. This claim was elicited and supported by Husserl’s investigations into 
the synthesis of time consciousness, and it takes on real urgency in his 1920s studies of 
passive association. Yet the claim urges some reconciliation of life (understood as self-
affection and as other living beings) with consciousness reduced to the transcendental 
flow and to passive syntheses.
1
 It his methodological neutrality, Husserl refused both 
                                                          
1
 In other words, over the twenty years in which he penned his notes on passive synthesis, Husserl 
recognized that events like “association” and changes in affects, mirrored life processes whose 
intelligibility alone could buttress a phenomenology extended to affectivity and even drives. Biology 
would provide this support as psycho-physics (Crisis, 400). Does this mean that a different path different 
from psychology and phenomenology was necessary for attaining a transcendental foundation? I prefer to 
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dualism and monism, but the task of developing a unified frame of description for bodily 
and mental events grew more manifest in his “genetic” investigations (i.e., those 
pertaining to the developmental aspects of consciousness, tied to the body). It is here that 
Nietzsche’s meditation on forces in bodies suggests a dialogue with phenomenology.  
 
Husserl’s Phenomenology: An Idealism? 
Before proceeding to Nietzsche, some remarks must be made about Husserl’s 
idealism. Husserl largely refused the label, especially not by the 1930s, when 
phenomenology was genetic and critical—of psychologistic consciousness and idealist 
abstractions, ushered in by the loss of the Lebenswelt (through Galileo’s mathematization 
of physics). The Crisis questioned back following a genealogy of the scientific 
worldview, in search of the Lebenswelt still present in Aristotle. It criticized Descartes’ 
dualist ontology. The upshot of these fundamental philosophical decisions was, as 
Husserl argued:  
The natural science of the modern period, establishing itself as physics, has 
its roots in the consistent abstraction through which it wants to see, in the 
life-world, only corporeity [Körperlichkeit]. Each “thing” “has” corporeity 
even though, if it is (say) a human being or a work of art, it is not merely 
bodily but is “embodied [verkörpert],” like everything real. Through such 
an abstraction, carried out with universal consistency, the world is reduced 
to abstract-universal nature…. (Hua VI, 230) 
Following this critical genealogy of modern philosophy, which Husserl carries out 
with rigor, the very notion of individuation is modified into substantial rei, associated 
with an equivocal, extended or a psychical substance, and set down as paradigmatic for 
all subsequent sciences including physics and psychology.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
say that Husserl was neither a monist nor a dualist. However, his increasing concern with life reflects the 
vaster question of a unified approach to it.  
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Human beings, concretely, in the space-time of the world, have their 
abstractly distinguished souls distributed among bodies, which make up, 
when we adopt the purely naturalistic consideration of bodies, a universe to 
be considered in itself as a totality. The souls themselves are external to one 
another…in their own abstract stratum, [but] they do not make up a parallel 
total universe. (Hua VI, 231) 
As against Idealism, “souls” in Husserl never constitute a universe eo ipso. The 
separation of individual psyches is analogous to the abstraction performed on life, 
breaking physical objects and topographies into homogeneous units. It is therefore the 
work of transcendental psychology to open a path to phenomenology, as the 
deformalization of consciousness without the spatial prejudice implicit in modernist 
abstraction (homogeneous units). The Crisis thus follows a critical-genealogical route 
back toward what Husserl had adumbrated already in the 1905-10 lectures on internal 
time-consciousness: consciousness understood in and as its proper medium, 
consciousness understood as transcendental and synthetic yet open to description. Husserl 
was seeking consciousness as subjective but not in all cases individuated. Living time 
consciousness was “absolute subjectivity” and a dynamic flow. Beyond that, Husserl 
“lacked concepts” in 1905.  
On the other hand, by 1936, the Crisis has staked out more original positions. It 
argued clearly that the individuation of “souls” is the result of the individuation of bodies, 
given the ease with which bodies can be separated and counted. It did not deny the 
significance of embodiment for consciousness. Yet it intimated the possibility of a 
totalization of consciousness, at least as Fink understood the project. Thus, while the 
early Husserl emphasized embodiment in service to the upwelling of now-moments 
forming consciousness, the genealogical phenomenology proposed reductions to what 
could be called meta-subjective effectivity, i.e., consciousness as pure act and livingness. 
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The Crisis aligned psychology and biology by lifting biology out of the realm of 
positivistic abstraction. What gave rise to this strategy? 
The absolute subjectivity as flow in the time-consciousness lectures is not alien to 
the hypothetical “pan-psychism” of the Crisis. The “words lacking” for the description of 
the originary source-point of the now and its resulting temporal flow, also take a new 
shape in Husserl’s passive synthesis investigations. There, he confronted the problem of 
the limits of the flow and the multiple forms of association taking place in a given now-
moment. He explored association as a process of contrast, similarity and identification, 
through our passive rapprochement of perceptions. In his notes from the 1920s, he thus 
moved toward a philosophy of becoming, arguing that “the unity of the thing itself is 
thinkable only as a unity continuously ordered and extended in time”. The possibility of 
association, whether as contrast or similarity, “rests…on the most originary continuity of 
the temporal extension” (Hua XI, 141). This most originary continuity presupposes 
“continuous becoming [kontinuierlichen Werden] within the temporal order” (Hua XI, 
141) and that becoming has its neurological correlate. While many associations appear 
gratuitous, irrational, or idiosyncratic, this is due to the fact that each sense (sight, 
hearing, touch, etc.) unfolds around itself a field particular to it, and “the ideal extension 
to infinity of the fields is a sort of idealization that we can accept…” (Hua XI, 148). Of 
course, this idealization is not Idealism, it is just a heuristic about time designed to 
parallel the dynamic permanence of the body. What, however, made possible the 




A more perplexing problem concerned that curious non-field called affectivity. 
Certain associations must be the result of an “originary affection,” notably contrastive 
associations. “[W]e must characterize contrast as the most originary condition 
[ursprünglichste Bedingung] of affection” (Hua XI, 149). Affection, or what was once 
called “passions,” opened phenomenological consciousness to the sheer complexity of 
embodiment and tied consciousness to its complement, forgetting. Affection is also 
intertwined with sensuous “data,” pleasure and pain—and with drives, the 
“representatives” in consciousness of the instincts. 
From the sphere of affect [Gemütssphäre] we must take into account only 
those feelings [Gefühle] originally tied to sensuous data and say: on the one 
hand, the affection coming into being is functionally codependent on the 
relative size of the contrast; on the other hand, it is also dependent on 
privileged sensuous sentiments [bevorzugenden sinnlichen Gefühlung] like a 
sentiment of sensuous pleasure grounded in its unity by that which detaches 
[from the flow of consciousness in an associative moment]. We must 
likewise allow for drive-preferences [triebmässige Bevorzugungen], [which 
are] originally instinctive. (Hua XI, 150).   
 
Uniting embodied perception with events in the Lebenswelt, along with embodied 
recollection of “privileged sensuous sentiments” and the surfacing of “drive preferences,” 
Husserl forges a living consciousness. Only “life” carries the spontaneity, even the 
disorder of affective or passional associations. Affects are woven together with sensibility 
(feelings of pleasure or pain), forming the conditions of possibility of overarching hyletic 
unities (Hua XI, 152). In the investigations into passive association, the phenomenology 
of consciousness reaches a descriptive level apt that accounts for phenomena of 
forgetting and “repression.” Essential in the study of associative phenomena is that so-
called “forces” in the body have their corollary—not their epiphenomena—in 
consciousness understood as an affectivity-sensibility interweave. What psychoanalysis 
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had ventured to describe as conscious “repression” of painful or conflictual events, 
opened to phenomenological description precisely thanks to emotions and affects (Hua 
XI, 152). 
As the privileged connection between embodiment and “mental” activity, affection 
and feelings not only allow Husserl to approach intentionality as a spectrum of 
intensities, they provide a glimpse into patterns whereby certain sets of ideas are as if 
held out of the sphere of associative reactivation. The existence of these patterns is not 
directly demonstrable, but it proves heuristically precious when we study the seemingly 
illogical memory associations. These “repressions” belong so intimately to intentional 
consciousness—which implies consciousness beyond the projections of an individual 
psyche—that Husserl could speak of “a phenomenology of this so-called unconscious” 
(Hua XI, 154). With the extension of phenomenological description beyond sense 
perception per se and into sensuous-affective association and recollection, the 
phenomenological sphere of consciousness came to encompass embodiment in a broad, 
almost anti-idealistic way. It understood “intentionality” in such a way that critics could 
no longer object that the formalism intrinsic to Husserl’s phenomenology missed the 
mark on corporeity, and that it could therefore never grasp the broader destiny of 
biology—i.e., beyond what biology inherited from modernity. 
 Let me summarize: starting from the genealogy Husserl proposes in the Crisis, I 
inquired whether phenomenology could offer an alternative biology that provided tools 
for understanding any life-world, including that in places presently unknown to human 
enquiry. I noted that this biology could stand as fundamental ontology, encompassing 
“the concrete world in its entirety [and] implicitly, physics itself” (Merleau-Ponty, Notes 
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de cours, p. 387).
2
 It also referred to the “concrete psycho-physics” (386) that necessarily 
accompanied the phenomenological project as its indispensable supplement. Clearly, as 
the psycho-physics adumbrated in the Crisis §66 had already shown, the biology Husserl 
had in mind was but a corollary to an a priori psychology of consciousness. This was 
radicalized in the Appendix, where biology became “absolutely universal philosophy” 
(387). How to parse the tension? 
As a complementary psycho-physics elucidating the claims of transcendental 
phenomenology, biology is averred by Fink’s proposed completion of the Crisis project. 
Taking Fink’s proposal to eliminate the mutual exteriority of Seele to each other as the 
legitimate end-point, I traced what I believe is the legitimate link between the time 
consciousness lectures of 1905 and the Crisis; namely, the search for “absolute 
subjectivity.” Because the works spanning the years 1926-1936 introduced a genetic and 
historical-critical (or “generative”) element,
3
 it is no longer merely absolute subjectivity 
that is pursued. It is, rather, consciousness understood as the synthesis of life and 
subjectivation that is at stake. This claim is borne out by many manuscripts, notably those 
that treat the life of feeling and affectivity. The courage of those notes on passive 
synthesis, preparing the Formal and Transcendental Logic, lies in their extraordinary 
expansion of the domain of consciousness into the most elusive and ostensibly arbitrary 
acts from inexplicable forgetting, memory lapses, to equally inexplicable associative 
connections. On the basis of that expansion, phenomenology could approach even the 
clinical observations of psychoanalysis. For example, it could understand Freud’s 
observations that repressed suffering spontaneously “associates” with bodily weaknesses, 
                                                          
2
 Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours, 1959-1961, ed. Claude Lefort (Paris: Gallimard/NRF, 1996), pp. 383-84. 
3
 See Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 33.  
11 
 
transforming them into symptoms like paralysis or cutaneous insensitivities. However, 
when pursued in psychotherapy, these associated psychophysical sufferings thrust roots 
into a past association of desire and conflict—of emotions and feelings—that could not 
come to light without description and dialogue. That would be the farthest 
phenomenological investigation can reach; i.e., toward the conditions of meaning, of life 
as lived sensation and affection, and thus as conscious coming into being.  
 
Husserl’s Biology to Come, Read with Nietzsche’s Hermeneutics of Bodily Forces 
 Nietzsche’s projected completion of Kant’s critical project entailed corporealizing 
theoretical reason, historicizing practical reason, and weaving together the affective 
inscription of history into bodies, utilizing concepts of forces. Speculatively, Nietzsche 
passed behind consciousness to forces in interpretation and conflict. This allowed him to 
use the body as the red thread of his philosophical project. We know that he read 
extensively in the materialist physiology of his time. He was familiar with Ernst 
Haeckel’s reception of Darwin and the agonistic physiology of Wilhelm Roux, for whom 
struggle for survival was the immanent struggle for ascendancy from which the bodily 
organs themselves evolved. Above all, Nietzsche extended the notion of forces into a 
hermeneutics without precedent, such that what forces did correlationally probatively 
defined what they were ontologically. The concept of Wille zur Macht denoted, in 
condensed form, the fact of forces as interactions; as Deleuze once put it force or will, “is 
the differential element of force.”
4
 I will return to this when I discuss Nietzsche’s 
hermeneutics. If, for Nietzsche, consciousness was the epiphenomenon of forces within 
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bodies, it nevertheless maintained a temporary dignity as sovereign awareness. Yet, 
consciousness mirrored patterns already occurring in the nervous system, in tissues, or 
between cells. Nietzsche’s “agnostic monism” of forces, even when translated as “wills to 
power,” was not concerned with mere material things. Force was one term among many 
with which Nietzsche sought to explain the fundamental production of value at all levels 
of embodied existence. He spoke of “judgment,” “spiritual event,” even “mind,” 
recognizing clearly that these concepts had come to denote what was intelligible to 
consciousness even though their power to conjoin or dissociate, to intensify or pacify, 
ameliorate or degrade was not limited to the activities of conscious life alone. They were 
better than metaphors; they were “catachreses,” denoting events for which “names are 
lacking us.” Stated otherwise, a trope—judiciously employed for an event, movement, or 
temporary entity that has no proper name—is not a fiction but a heuristic designed to 
expand the intelligibility of the things. 
Up to now both explanations of organic life have failed to work out; neither 
that from mechanics, nor that from mind [aus dem Geiste]. I would stress 
the latter. Mind is more superficial than one suspects. The governance of 
organisms occurs in such a way that the mechanical world, just as much as 
the spiritual one, can only be used symbolically as explanation (KSA, 1884, 
26, [68]). 
Though he rejected mechanistic thought in the triumphalist form it assumed in his day,
5
 
Nietzsche urged that the more pernicious error lay in the direction of Idealism. “The body 
                                                          
5
 Cf. Nietzsche, KSA XIII, 14 (79), Spring 1888. In a late outline for his project on the Wille zur Macht, 
Nietzsche wrote, of mechanistic philosophy: “Quanta of power [Machtquanta]. Critique of Mechanism. 
Let us set aside [from our project] two popular concepts: ‘necessity’ and ‘law’ [Gesetz]: the first posits a 
false compulsion [Zwang], the second [inserts] a false freedom into the world. ‘Things’ do not behave 
[betragen sich] in a regular fashion, not according to a Rule: there are no things (-- that is our fiction) [and] 
they behave even less under a compulsion of necessity.”  
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[der Leib] as teacher: A moral sign language [Zeichensprache] of the affects.”
6
 In the 
following year, he noted:  
—All movements are to be grasped as behaviors, as a kind of language [eine 
Art Sprache], through which the forces understand each other…. Problem of 
the possibility of “error?” The opposition is not “false,” and “true,” but 
rather the “abbreviations of signs” in contrast with the signs themselves. 
The essential [thing for us] is: the construction of forms that represent many 
movements [welche viele Bewegungen repräsentieren], the invention of 




Nietzsche interpreted the interactions of forces “semiotically” as the 
multiple interactions of partial meanings, expressed by “abbreviations of signs” at 
every level of existence. That was Nietzsche’s perspectivalism and his agnostic 
monism, and we must recall that the term “semiotics,” as the technique of 
communication and its interpretation, denoted in his time that branch of medicine 
concerned with interpreting bodily symptoms—an eidetics. In this way, the 
distance between thought and bodily processes could be diminished without 
introducing an idealistic interpretation of “mind” or a merely mechanistic 
approach to the body.  
 
Thought is not yet the internal event itself, but rather only a language of 




There is neither a positivistic biology nor a mechanics of forces in Nietzsche. The 
figure of forces unfolds through two basic stages: the critiques of mechanics and 
idealism, followed by the reconceptualization of communication as sign-interactions and 
the generalization of force as behavior and “language.” Since human language is 
                                                          
6
 KSA XI, 15 (113), Winter 1884. 
7
 KSA XI, I (28), Fall 1885-Winter 1886.  
8
 KSA XI, I (28), Fall 1885-Winter 1886. Hereafter abbreviated in the text.  
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fundamentally metaphorical, “meaning” depends on the flexibility that tropes introduce 
into expression. Thus, the second stage entails a search for connections between operative 
signs in bodies and those “abbreviations of signs” that explain the former and “sum up 
whole types of signs.” This requires reading beneath the description of the contents of 
consciousness, because “thought is not yet the internal event itself, but rather only a 
language of signs [Zeichensprache], a semiotics of power adjustments.” Semiotics 
notwithstanding, the most effective way past the mechanistic reduction of forces would 
be through a phenomenology of affectivity, as epiphenomena of forces, and through the 
extension of the interpretive strategy beyond human languages to as broad a domain of 
codes as possible. Here, “codes” simply denote momentary stabilizations of force, “meta-
stabilizations.” The first step in this paradoxical naturalization of hermeneutics—which 
Nietzsche calls “humanization…according to us” (KSA XI, I, 28)—turns on 
acknowledging that interpretation is locally purposive. That is, what we call “value-
judgments [Werthschätzungen] abide in all sense-activities [Sinnes-Thätigkeiten]” (KSA, 
XI, 26, [72]).
9
 The concept of judgment must be extended past discursive construction.
10
 
The ground of an investigation of life is therefore twofold for Nietzsche: it is essentially 
interpretive dynamics in view of an operational good or growth (for tissues, for an 
organism, for a species, for a community), and it is the heuristic “unit” of exchange called 
                                                          
9
 Note also KSA XI, 25 (401), Winter 1884:  “There must be an abundance of consciousnesses and wills in 
each complex organic being: our uppermost consciousness takes it as habitual [that] the others are closed 
[geschlossen]. The smallest organic creature [Geschöpf] must have consciousness and will.” As if by 
implication, value judgments, like needs, had to be sought in “Life.” What is life for Nietzsche? It is a 
dynamics of encounters, interpretations, and “judgments,” creating fragile equilibriums. Clearly, the 
Kantian project, centered on the meaning and possibility of judgment, is “biologized” and extended to a 
multilayered nature.  
 
10
 See, for example, KSA XII, 2 (84), Fall 1885-Fall 1886: “The [act of] judging is our oldest belief, our 
habitual taking for-true or for-untrue.” 
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Kräfte [forces]. These are fundamentally the same, approached from different 
perspectives. That is why “the humanization of nature” is unique in Nietzsche and 
depends on a multi-leveled dynamics using combinators called Zeichen (signs). 
Now, that is not to say that psycho-physics can be phenomenology; at least, given 
the analytic constituents of the phenomenological project: noematic aiming, noetic 
objects, and beneath these a “flowing field of lived experiences, in the midst of which 
there is continuously a field of originary impressions…and…the ego that is affected by 
[that field] and motivated to action.”
11
 Yet, again, Nietzsche himself is not so much 
proposing a psycho-physics as he is seeking imbricated languages or signs for what 
conditions the phenomena but is not phenomenalizable: Kräfte, Triebe. But then, what is 
psycho-physics if not a search for the dynamic accompaniment and conditions of 
possibility of what we call “psychic” life?  
A certain conundrum arises: What Husserl knew of Nietzsche likely came to him 
through Heidegger’s ongoing interpretation of the latter, yet nothing leads us to believe 
that Husserl grasped the radicality of Nietzsche’s revaluation of psycho-physics. 
However, if a crucial dimension of Husserl’s expanded phenomenology to come was to 
be biology, as he indicated, then could psycho-physics expand, rather than displace, 
transcendental psychology; say, by recognizing that the material and the laws of the 
psycho-physics operate alongside, but independently of, the phenomenological reduction 
of consciousness? It is clear that, in psycho-physics, mechanistic causality, as well as 
higher-level distinctions between thought, memory, and fantasy invariably stand under 
the subjective-objective dichotomy rather than under the phenomenological epochē that 
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 Husserl, Manuscript C 7 I, p. 18; cited by Didier Franck, Dramatique des Phénomènes (Paris : Presses 
universitaires de France, 2001, p. 112. 
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provides us “experience” before subjects and objects are parsed out. Could the dichotomy 
flowing from the world thesis intrinsic to positive science be used critically, rather than 
being imposed on a phenomenology of fundamental conscious activity? Certainly, and 
Nietzsche’s (de-)humanization of forces opened toward models of self-regulating 
processes, with some stasis, but not substantification, and the rejection of linear causality. 
Nietzsche’s agnostic monism “materializes” and historicizes Kant’s conception of 
“judgment,” using what Klossowski aptly translated as “semiotics” without one single 
interpretive code. If the problem of a “hermeneutic biology”—one similarly close to what 
Merleau-Ponty sought in thinking Husserl’s Ineinander (in-each-other) of phenomena, as 
the entrelacs—is how to overcome the dualism between living (self-affecting) beings and 
beings observed as alive, then Nietzsche’s was the most radical such overcoming in the 
19
th
 century.  
As a perspectival monism, Nietzsche’s use of forces as his “common currency” is 
not uncommon in the history of science, in which force was necessarily something 
imperceptible, and its “effects” reconstructive. In Nietzsche, however, a dynamics of 
signs opens ultimately to a good—virtually “moral”—albeit expanded beyond any ethics 
of “good and evil.” This dimension of his project is pre-Modern, prior to the 
regionalization of reason, or to types of substances. We ought not to take it, however, as 
foreign to the phenomenological monism Merleau-Ponty was seeking. Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy of nature explored an expanded sense of the interpretation of information in 
cybernetic models, arguing critically about the latter in light of self-conscious beings. 
17 
 
“…the positive value of cybernetics [lies in that] it invites us to discover an animality in 
the subject, an apparatus for organizing perspectives….”
12
  
Bridging forces and the flesh: from Nietzsche to Merleau-Ponty  
It is neither possible nor ultimately desirable to synthesize Nietzsche and Husserl. 
However, something like their “dialogue” is worked out implicitly in subsequent 
developments of phenomenology. Working from Husserl’s explorations of 
intersubjective constitution, Einfühlung, and the flesh [der Leib],
13
 Merleau-Ponty first 
extended Husserl’s investigations of the “flesh” of language and body into perception 
very broadly conceived.
14
 The tension between biology as “universal ontology” and 
psychology as the ladder toward Husserl’s final, transcendental philosophy in the Crisis 
could thus be approached as two pillars of phenomenology, not as vacillation on 
Husserl’s part. To be sure, the problem of psycho-physics was rather late in coming to 
Husserl, with, among other things, the phenomenological constitution of “a universal 
drive-intentionality.”
15
 There again, hermeneutic biology represented the indispensable 
supplement, the heuristic ladder leading from a comprehensive psychology to 
phenomenology itself.  
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 Merleau-Ponty, La nature. Notes de cours du Collège de France, ed. Dominique Séglard (Paris: Seuil, 
1995), pp. 214-19. 
13
 See, for example, Husserl’s notes “Flesh—Thing—Intropathy: Relation of the Body (Leib) and the Soul, 
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Nevertheless, the phenomenological grounding of all sciences may constitute a 
debate that resists closure, since the relationship between phenomenologically reduced 
experience and experience objectified by sciences like biology remains to be clarified. 
The difficulty that emerges from Husserl’s search for a reconfigured biology in Appendix 
XXIII was that it had to elucidate psychology as “psycho-physics”
16
 and form the ground 
from which one could describe other life-worlds, including those of animals and of 
worlds foreign to us. This projected biology opened toward ontologies presently 
unknown [unbekannte Ontologie], and all of this indicates a quest for a dualism at least 
sublated or circumscribed by a hypothetical monism.  
If we return to the ultimate sources of evidence…it appears that biology is 
not a contingent discipline in relation to an insignificant planet… [but that] 
a general biology has the same world-commonality [Weltallgemeinheit] as 
physics. The entire meaning that a biology of Venus might have, of whose 




Although Appendix XXIII was a thought-experiment, it was utterly representative 
of the direction Husserl was striving to take. Its precise place in the version we have of 
the Crisis is unclear, and may be contested by Fink’s proposed completion of the work. 
However, what is important is that the radicalized approach to life, understood as the 
Ineinander of living beings in humans, runs parallel with the correlation structure of 
organisms and their worlds, as well as the a priori correlation of noesis and noema. 
Merleau-Ponty’s comments on the Appendix suggest that Husserl is rethinking 
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Heidegger: “Organism: Ineinander of subjectivity, I (and finally I, reflecting) and 
corporeal machines. The organism [as] a variant of Einfühlung. I know the [other] 
organism because I am it [parce que je le suis]. Relation Being man cf. Heidegger (All 
things in man, but because man is all things).”
18
 We know that Merleau-Ponty is more 
indebted to Husserl than it seemed at the time of his death, in 1961. It was Husserl who, 
by the mid-1930s, had first pondering a multi-dimensional ontology: world of life, “life 
of consciousness,” and animal and alien life-worlds. It could well be argued that, as 
universal ontology and as psycho-physics, biology momentarily gave Husserl more than a 
path toward transcendental phenomenology. Indeed, the hermeneutic biology, or 
“universal ontology” set forth in Appendix XXIII could even clarify Fink’s outline for 
the completion of the Crisis (cf. Appendix XXIX) through the adumbration of a “world-
consciousness”, in which “the appearance of the mutual externality of souls 
[Aussereinander der Seelen]” is decisively contested (Hua XI, Appendix XXIX, 514-16).  
If we ponder this extension, then Fink’s Husserl is opening a path not readily 
inferred from his pre-1920s writings; that toward a world-consciousness approached 
simultaneously from transcendental psychology and from a “biology [become] truly 
universal.”
19
 That would agree with his investigations into the universal drive-
intentionality proper to all living beings. While it does not resolve the problem of life as 
self-affection versus life as the observed, living alterity of other beings in the world, it 
does rethink the best elements in the vitalist biology of his time.  
Ineinander: Nietzsche and (Neuro-)phenomenology 
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 Recent neuro-phenomenology, indebted to Merleau-Ponty, is developing a 
dynamic materialism that is hypothetically monist, but does not reduce consciousness to 
mere brain activity. If we acknowledge the impossibility of constructing a bridge between 
the immanence of pure self-affection and objective, living beings, we do not have to 
abandon Husserl’s Ineinander or Merleau-Ponty’s entrelacs or chiasm. We should hold 
fast—as we examine neuro-phenomenology—the need for a concept that joins perception 
and world. And indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s great merit was to have approached conscious 
life from both directions: from lived experience (interpretation) and from a philosophy of 
nature (biology and aspects of Lebensphilosophie). That said, Merleau-Ponty had already 
ventured past Husserl’s approach to consciousness by exploiting resources in the 
psychoanalysis of pathology, by examining “perception” in neuroses (Freud’s Dora) and 
“perception” in the delirium staged in Jensen’s novel, Gradiva.
20
 Moreover, he proposed 
what he called an “aesthesiology” of the lived body, contrasting the vitalism of Hans 
Driesch (1921) with the animal behaviorism of von Uexküll.   
 Influenced by Merleau-Ponty, Bernard Andrieu moves in a similarly monist 
direction. Although he does not mention him, Andrieu’s monism strikingly recalls 
Nietzsche’s experiments. For Andrieu, the neuro-philosophical question is less one of 
finding common units or forces at work in living bodies, than one of consolidating an 
informational model, with its accompanying sign language, with a programming model 
that takes into account the ongoing influence of exchanges between world, body, and 
thought. This is clearly one of the recent extensions of Husserl’s Ineinander. Andrieu’s 
project of a matérialisme dynamique is thus based neither on electrical nor hydraulic 
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metaphors, as was traditionally proposed. He argues, instead, for a “flesh of the brain,” 
integrating Merleau-Ponty’s subjectivations through, and as, perception with Nietzsche’s 
operative forces. On Andrieu’s account, the brain proves to be the “progressive 
incarnation of incorporations [taken from without].”
21
 If phenomenology sought to 
complexify subjectivity, understood as something static, then Andrieu will argue, 
following Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche, that “subjectivity is a result of a continuous 
movement of adaptation and regulation” (CP, 560). He means that subjectivity is firstly a 
body which, itself, is, above all, a variable locus of interactions. He reminds us that 
“nothing entirely objective can be known…” (CP, 560), arguing that something 
absolutely objective would be open to no “perception,” to no possible interaction with 
living bodies. This allows Andrieu to conclude that “the knowledge of the world [is] 
relative to each human body. [Moreover, the] relativity of each one in no way forbids the 
establishment…of a provisional truth about the human body within the scientific attitude” 
(CP, 560). Following a model of dynamic subjectivation, animal consciousness broadly 
construed can be defined as adaptive interactions and as a structure of self-interruption 
(viz., as the possibility or inaugural hesitation intrinsic to reflection). Consistent with 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the flesh, Andrieu argues for the body as an interface, in 
which the brain produces consciousness indirectly as surplus activity. This is thanks to 
the multiplicity of interactions between environments and bodies, even between tissues. 
Hence the programming model mentioned above, which operates like an in-forming, at 
multiple levels, in regard to “information” in continuous exchange. The resemblance to 
Nietzsche is striking.  
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 Like Merleau-Ponty, Andrieu also argues for an aesthesiology that presupposes 
biology but does not start with it:  
Sensation is felt by means of the nervous structure in the body, such that 
two human bodies can never experience the same intensity with regard to 
the same object. Psychometry, modernized by electro-physiology, quantifies 
the quality of lived experiences of the body. This method establishes an 
objective knowledge by measuring reaction times and perceptual thresholds. 
But the visualization of electrical exchanges will never say anything about 
the way in which the body feels these in itself (CP, 560). 
Because he is approaching body, consciousness, and thought as part of a single 
interactive model, Andrieu proposes what I would call an epochē of quantity. He holds 
temporarily out of consideration quantificational models, without denying their 
significance to particular contexts of explanation, much the way Husserl bracketed the 
positive sciences without ever denying their applicability. If experienced sensations and 
affects are continuously transformed from qualities into quantities, then quality must be 
considered primordial; the first lived transitivity. The primacy of bio-hermeneutics is thus 
only supplemented by a physico-chemical reduction. Aesthesiology points in the 
direction of a body in the process of (qualitative) subjectivation. As Andrieu emphasizes, 
“Two human bodies can never feel the same intensity with regard to the same object. 
This impossible intersubjectivity keeps bodies outside of themselves and each body in 
itself, thereby making difficult any linguistic expression of aesthesiological lived 
experience” (CP, 560, emphasis added). Approached from the perspective of psycho-
physics, Andrieu’s aesthesiology well describes the transitivity of life, understood as the 
movements of bodies outside themselves, toward... Recent phenomenology (Renaud 





 A body outside-itself is a body “toward-the-other,” whether this “other” is the 
world or another person or entity. The advantage of the model proposed here lies in its 
ability to explain individuation, interaction without reductionism, and a certain 
“autonomy” of conscious thought relative to neurological activity. “Autonomy” need not 
mean “independence”; however, the nature of the contents of thoughts—sentences, 
images—creates the illusion of independence. Indeed, in this project, which borrows 
extensively from Gilbert Simondon’s “resolute monism” (CP, 561), the organization of 
the body, and with it mental activity, proceeds ongoingly in interactive connections (CP, 
563). “Psychological individuation comes down to that of the central nervous system in 
interactive communication with its genetic programming” (CP, 563). This 
programming—in the development of brain-consciousness—takes place at multiple 
levels, as it did in Nietzsche. One of these is REM sleep, wherein interactions are laid 
down and stabilized temporarily.  
 Another possible way through our conundrum is via the enactive approach to 
consciousness, proposed by the late neuro-phenomenologist Francisco Varela, and 
expanded in Evan Thompson’s Mind in Life.
23
 The enactive approach “uses 
phenomenology to explicate mind science and mind science to explicate 
phenomenology” as reciprocally elucidating (ML, 265). According to their account, 
indebted both to dynamical systems theory and to Merleau-Ponty, an organism and its 
primitive milieu (Urwelt) cannot be separated, including on a conceptual level, without 
doing violence to their dynamic coupling. The enactive approach proposes that “living is 
sense-making” (ML, 158): The meaning of an “environment,” the information that is 
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available for an organism about its milieu, is not simply “out there.” Rather, the 
organism, as an autonomous and autopoietic system, along with its Urwelt to which it is 
structurally coupled, form a dynamical system in which the organizational and 
operational closure
24
 of the organism confers to it a stable identity, while simultaneously 
giving meaning (i.e., “valence,” or value in an almost Nietzschean sense) to its 
surroundings. This argument is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s account of forces that co-
determine each other dynamically. It complements the approach to the notion of 
autonomy that Andrieu proposed, taking it in a mathematical, informational direction. 
In both these neuro-phenomenological models, subjectivity is never a fixed result 
but an ongoing process. Individuation is similarly not an outcome but a term ingredient to 
the definition of any milieu, any environment (CP, 564). Finally, the life of an animal 
unfolds progressively, through fragile stabilizations generally open to degrees of 
modification. As Andrieu puts it, “‘We are thus in the presence of a system of 
progressive nestings [emboîtements] of representations and levels of reality, from the 
genome to the brain, passing through the body’. In re-evaluating the role of the body in 
the physiological representation that the brain [develops] of its own genome, thought 
[broadly construed] becomes the site of the living body” (CP, 565, citing Prochiantz).
25
  
 The spirit of aesthesiology is faithful to phenomenology, notably the late 
phenomenology that reached toward biology as a psycho-physics and the authentic 
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ontology. This concern was both Husserl’s own, late in life, and that of Merleau-Ponty. 
The paradox of the dual approach I noted, is precisely that, to reach anything like a 
hypothetical monism of living being, requires a concerted dual path. Nietzsche 
understood this, elaborating a poetics of living (Zarathustra) and a poietics of forces 
drawn from his reading of 19
th
 century physiology. The epochē Andrieu seems to have 
placed on quantity has, as its goal, to dispense us with “meta-physical” units, imported 
into arguments to measure quanta of excitations. Nietzsche, for his part, had long since 
demonstrated the necessity of deconstructing such units, whether Reiz, atoms, or souls. In 
light of recent work in neuroscience, Andrieu adds:  
Reasoning on pathology has been able to show the connection…between 
this [bodily] matter and these mental forms [sentences, images]. When 
destroyed or injured, the physico-chemical matter of our sensibility can no 
longer furnish matter for thinking; or rather, there is a proportional 
relationship between the quality of sensations and the qualities of mental 
activities. The body furnishes matter for thinking even if the way in which 
thought represents its mental states is perceived by it as if independent (CP, 
565).     
 To insist on autonomy, but not independence, reopens the thinking of the body-mind 
imbrications and in so doing, invites us to reconceive thought as “a surplus of brain 
activity,” or better, as the body thinking itself through mental representations. This 
further implies a necessary “complementarity between the brain and the unconscious and 
poses the problem of continuity between the two” (CP, 567). 
 As we know, it was Nietzsche’s project to reconceptualize Kant’s “judgment.” 
His choice of force managed to elude the problem of units of quantity, opting instead for 
an early dynamics. Nietzsche’s dynamics introduced interpretation, accommodation, and 
domination into the biological model of his time, emphasizing structures of obedience 
26 
 
and command in order to preserve the hierarchy intrinsic to value judgments. This simply 
means that certain organizations of cells, tissues, even living beings “work” better for 
their growth and flourishing than do others. The problem we noted of a common currency 
is temporarily suspended with the epochē on quantity—displacing for heuristic ends the 
primacy of quantity and its metaphysical recourse to units of measure. As a number of 
Husserl’s commentators have asked (Paul Ricoeur, among them): What are we to make 
of conscious life when we remove the phenomenological brackets? Could not a similar 
question be posed of the neuro-phenomenology flowing simultaneously out of Gilbert 
Simondon and Maurice Merleau-Ponty? To be sure. But what we would have, upon 
removing the brackets, simply breaks into the objects of psychology and biology, or 
again, comes down to human experience as the object of multiple sciences or regional 
ontologies. 
 Gilbert Simondon, like Andrieu and others since the publication of his work in the 
1960s, attempted to demonstrate the possibility of a monism based on energetic 
interactions. His work resists summary because of its complexity and the plethora of new 
concepts he created. Some of these were the direct result of advances in chemistry and 
geophysics. The formation of crystalline structures provided one image of what he called 
“systems of potentials,” on the basis of which elementary schemas constitute “meta-
stable fields.”
26
 The meta-stable field comes from the dynamics of liquids but should not 
be restricted to that domain. It could well be argued that the Nietzschean contribution to a 
psycho-physics lies in its similar refusal of statics and individual substances. And this 
strikingly anticipates the structural coupling and dynamic co-determination of organism 
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and Urwelt in Thompson and von Uexküll. Without denying that beings “individuate” in 
transitional and ongoing ways, Nietzsche strove to keep his forces within a framework 
wherein becoming was not opposed to being. He might have found a real interest in the 
innovations of Simondon, Andrieu, Thompson, and Varella.  
That does not mean that we can, or should, speak poetically of qualities, as though 
no difficulties arose in the absence of some theory of energy or energetics. But most of 
these theories shared the fate of socio-political environments through whose lens they 
were read and adjusted to the ideals of a given cultural politics. Those readings are, of 
course, as hazardous as Hans Driesch’s 1930’s vitalism in which the concept of organic 
totality and a governing principle slid deplorably into an aestheticized, politicized 
Führerprinzip.
27
 Such slippages may be unavoidable and an entire history of 19th and 
early 20th century misappropriations of vitalism and Lebensphilosophie could be written. 
Nevertheless, the imperative of bridging body-world and mind-body dualisms must be 
taken up by a biology in continuous dialogue with psychology and, today, with neuro-
philosophy. I have argued throughout that that was the direction in which Husserl’s 
biology as the universal ontology was moving.   
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